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Behrooz Tahmasebi and Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the problem of private sequential function computation, where
a user wishes to compute a composition of a sequence of K linear functions, in a specific
order, for an arbitrary input. The user does not run these computations locally, rather it
exploits the existence of N non-colluding servers, each can compute any of the K functions
on any given input. However, the user does not want to reveal any information about the
desired order of computations to the servers. For this problem, we study the capacity C,
defined as the supremum of the number of desired computations, normalized by the number of
computations done at the servers, subject to the privacy constraint. In particular, we prove that
(1 − 1
N
)/(1− 1max(K,N) ) ≤ C ≤ 1. For the achievability, we show that the user can retrieve the
desired order of computations, by choosing a proper order of inquiries among different servers,
while keeping the order of computations for each server fixed, irrespective of the desired order of
computations. In the end, we develop an information-theoretic converse which results an upper
bound on the capacity.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing storage and computation to external parties are the inevitable reaction to the growing
size of data and increasing load of processing. One of the main challenges in those arrangements
is to ensure the privacy of data and algorithms, with minimum overhead in terms of computation,
storage, and communication.
Recently, in the context of private information retrieval (PIR), it is shown that redundancy in
data storage over multiple servers can significantly reduce the communication overhead of preserving
privacy. In PIR, a user wishes to retrieve a specific file from a database, duplicated across multiple
non-colluding servers, while the file identity must be kept private from the servers. In [2], the basic
PIR problem has been investigated from an information-theoretic viewpoint and its capacity has
been characterized. The capacity there is defined as the maximum number of desired information
bits per bit of download in privacy preserving algorithms. This work has been followed for different
scenarios, including but not limited to, multiround PIR [3], PIR with colluding servers [4], PIR
with coded storage [5, 6], PIR with eavesdroppers [7], PIR with adversary [8], PIR from wiretap
channel [9], cache-aided PIR [10–12], PIR with coded and colluding servers [13–15], connections
between PIR and distributed storage systems [16], and many other problems [17–36]. The problem
of anonymous communication, which is identical to the dual of PIR, is also investigated [37].
Private computation, also known as private function retrieval (PFR), is a problem, where the
user wants to compute a linear combination of the files, stored in replicated servers without revealing
any information about the coefficients [38, 39]. In [38], it is shown that the capacity of the private
computation is the same as the capacity of PIR. This means that private computation does not
have any extra cost than private retrieval of pure files. This problem is also considered for the
coded databases [40–42]. This is also extended to private computation of arbitrary polynomials on
Lagrange coded data [43] (see also [44]).
Another popular formulation of private computation is the secure multi-party computation
model [45–47]. In the secure multi-party computation, a group of parties are trying to perform
a computation task on their private inputs without disclosing any information about them to each
other [48]. This means that the objective here is to keep the inputs secure. In this context, an im-
portant question is to derive the minimum number of servers required to perform such task. Here,
the servers may also collude, up to a given number, in order to gain information about the private
inputs. A new formulation of this problem is also recently proposed, where the communication con-
straint for the computation of high dimensional inputs is also considered. For more explanations,
see [49–52].
In this paper, we introduce a new and different formulation for the problem of private computa-
tion. We introduce the problem of private sequential function computation as follows. Assume that
we have a number of basic functions {F1, F2, . . . , FK}. Using the composition of these basic func-
tions, we can construct a wide class of functions of interest. A user wishes to compute a particular
composition of a number of those basic functions for an arbitrary input. The user also wants to
offload the computation to N non-colluding servers which can compute the basic functions, while
keeping the desired function secure. Due to the propriety of the basic functions, in this problem,
to ensure the privacy, the only information that is needed to be kept secure from the servers is the
order of the composition. In this paper, we study this problem for the cases that the basic functions
are linear and so they can be represented by square matrices, and also we assume that in the desired
composition of the user, each function Fk appears only once
1.
1We note that there are applications where the computation of a complicated function is the main goal of the
problem, and this function is identical to the composition of a number of basic functions, e.g., see [53].
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To achieve the desired result, the user sends a sequence of inquiries to the servers in a recursive
manner2. Each time it sends an inquiry, including a vector and the index of a function, to one
of the servers, and waits for that server to return the multiplication of the corresponding matrix
to that vector. Then it forms another inquiry for one of the servers, as a function of the initial
input vectors, the results of the previous inquiries, and possibly some extra random vectors. In
the end, the user should be able to compute the final result, and the servers should not gather any
information about the order of computations.
In the private sequential function computation problem, the capacity is defined as the supremum
of the number of desired computations per query, subject to the privacy constraint. In this paper,
we derive non-trivial lower and upper bounds on the capacity of the private sequential function
computation as (1 − 1
N
)/(1 − 1max(K,N)) ≤ C ≤ 1. For the achievability, we show that the user can
compute the desired order of computations, by choosing a proper order of inquiries among different
servers, while keeping the order of computations for each server fixed, irrespective of the desired
order of computations. Therefore, each server observes a fixed order of computations, and thus
gains no information about the desired order of computations.
We then provide an information theoretic converse, which results to an upper bound on the
capacity. Moreover, we state an open problem regarding the one-shot capacity of the private se-
quential computation (i.e., the capacity in the non-asymptotic regime). While this problem remains
open through the paper, we show that in a special case, the one-shot capacity of the problem is
equal to the achieved lower bound on the (asymptotic) capacity of the problem. Our achievable
scheme in this case is essentially different from the achievable scheme for the (asymptotic) capacity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the mathematical model
considered in the paper. Section 3 includes the main result of the paper. To prove the theorem, we
first provide a number of illustrative examples in Section 4, and then present the achievable scheme
in Section 5. The achievability proof is provided in Section 6, while the proof of the upper bound on
the capacity is presented in Section 7. We then mention an open problem in Section 8, and finally,
Section 9 concludes the paper.
Notation: For any positive integers a, b, let [a : b] := {a, a+1, . . . , b}. We use SK to denote the
set of all permutations of [1 : K]. Using Σ = (ΣKΣK−1 . . .Σ1) ∈ SK , we denote the permutation
k 7→ Σk. Throughout the paper F is an arbitrary finite filed. The summation in F is denoted by
⊕. All the logarithms are in the base of |F|. For two random variables X,Y we write X ∼ Y
whenever X and Y are identically distributed. The notation Wi:j means (Wi,Wi+1, . . . ,Wj). For
two functions f(n), g(n), we write f(n) = o(g(n)), when f(n)
g(n) → 0, as n→∞.
2 Problem Statement
Consider a system, including a user, having access to T ∈ N input vectors W1,W2, . . . ,WT , chosen
independently and uniformly at random from FL, for some finite field F and some integer L. Thus,
H(W1,W2, . . . ,WT ) =
T∑
t=1
H(Wt) = TL. (1)
The user wishes to retrieve the result of the sequential (composition) computation of K linear
functions on its input vectors in a specific order. The functions are represented by K square
matrices F1, F2, . . . , FK ∈ F
L×L, that are distributed independently and uniformly over the set of
2In this paper, it is assumed that the servers are not synchronized.
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invertible matrices3 in FL×L, thus,
H(F1, F2, . . . , FK) =
K∑
k=1
H(Fk). (2)
The sequence of computations is represented by a permutation Σ = (ΣKΣK−1 · · ·Σ1) of [1 : K],
selected by the user uniformly at random from the set of all possible permutations. Thus, the user
wants the result of FΣK (FΣK−1(· · ·FΣ2(FΣ1Wt) · · · )) for all t ∈ [1 : T ]. This means that the order
of computations is the same for all T input vectors. The user does not have any information about
the matrices Fk, k ∈ [1 : K]. To obtain the desired result, it relies on N ∈ N non-colluding servers,
each has access to the full knowledge of Fk, k ∈ [1 : K].
4 We also refer to the parameter T as the
number of requests in the paper.
Each time that a server is called by the user, it receives some vector V ∈ FL along with an index
k ∈ [1 : K], and returns FkV to the user. Assume that the servers are not synchronized. Also,
assume that the user utilizes the servers D times in total, in order to achieve its desired results. This
means that the user generates a sequence of queries Q1, Q2, . . . , QD, where query Qd, d ∈ [1 : D], is
an ordered triple Qd = (Q
(server)
d , Q
(input)
d , Q
(function)
d ), meaning that the user at the d
th step, sends
Q
(input)
d ∈ F
L to the server Q
(server)
d ∈ [1 : N ], and asks it to run the function Q
(function)
d ∈ [1 : K].
The server then computes the desired result, denoted by Ad, Ad = FQ(function)
d
Q
(input)
d ∈ F
L, and
sends it to the user.
A (K,N, T,D,L) scheme of private sequential computation comprises of a sequence of (possibly
randomized) encoders Φd, d ∈ [1 : D], such that Qd = Φd(W1:T , A1:d−1,Σ). In addition, it includes
a sequence of functions (decoders) Ψt, t ∈ [1 : T ], such that Ψt(W1:T , A1:D,Σ) is an estimation of
FΣKFΣK−1 . . . FΣ1Wt.
Definition 1. The rate of a (K,N, T,D,L) computation scheme is defined as R = KT
D
.
Remark 1. The motivation of this definition for the rate is that in a (K,N, T,D,L) computation
scheme, the user wants to compute a composition of K functions on T input vectors (total of KT
computations) and it utilizes the servers for D times.
To state the privacy constraint, we need to specify a notation for the sequence of queries received
by each server.
Definition 2. For any n ∈ [1 : N ], the list of queries received by server n is denoted by
Q˜n :=
(
Qd : d ∈ [1 : D] and Q
(server)
d = n
)
. (3)
Remark 2. Note that the order of the received queries in Q˜n is known at server n. However, each
server does not know the locations of its received queries in the query list of the user, i.e., the exact
values of index d for the queries are unknown at the server side, although their relative orders are
known.
Now we are ready to present the definition of the achievable rates and the capacity of the private
sequential computation problem.
3 Note that the set of invertible matrices includes almost all of the matrices, specifically in high dimensions.
4Note that if we assume that the user knows Fk, k ∈ [1 : K], then we cannot bound the possible computational
limits at the user side with an information theoretic measure. By this assumption, the servers must compute the
functions.
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Definition 3. For any positive integers K,N, T,D, a positive real R is said to be T−achievable, if
there is a sequence of (K,N, T,D,L) computation scheme {Φ
(L)
1:D,Ψ
(L)
1:T }
∞
L=1 with the rate of at least
R, such that
• [Correctness] For any t ∈ [1 : T ],
P
(
Ψ
(L)
t (W
(L)
1:T , A
(L)
1:D,Σ) 6= F
(L)
ΣK
F
(L)
ΣK−1
· · ·F
(L)
Σ1
W
(L)
t
)
= o(1). (4)
• [Privacy] For any n ∈ [1 : N ], L ∈ N, the list of queries Q˜
(L)
n received by server n must be
independent from the order of computations, i.e., I(Q˜
(L)
n , F
(L)
1:K ; Σ) = 0.
Definition 4. A positive rate R is said to be achievable, if there is a sequence of T−achievable
rates {RT }T∈N, such that lim
T→∞
RT = R.
Definition 5. The capacity of the private sequential computation, denoted by C, is defined as the
supremum of all achievable rates.
3 Main Result
The main result of this paper is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The capacity of the private sequential computation problem satisfies the following
inequality:
(1−
1
N
)/(1 −
1
max(K,N)
) ≤ C ≤ 1, (5)
where K is the number of function to be computed in a sequential and private manner, and N is
the number of non-colluding servers.
Remark 3. When K ≤ N , the capacity is equal to one. This means that if the number of functions
does not exceed the number of servers, then one can achieve the private computation without any
cost. This is not surprising, because a simple one-shot (i.e., T = 1) function computation scheme
in which each function is asked to be computed by one specific server ensures privacy.
Remark 4. When K > N , the user wishes to compute a number of functions which is greater than
the number of available servers. Intuitively speaking, in this case there is at least one server that
must compute at least two functions. This means that to achieve privacy, the order of computations
at that server should not leak information about the desired order of computations. To ensure
privacy in this case, we propose a scheme which has a surprising feature: the order of computations
at each server is fixed, irrespective of the desired order of computations. The user can retrieve
any order of computations, by selecting an appropriate order for queries Q1, Q2, . . . , QD, such that
the order of computations at each server remains fixed. Some randomness is added to the inputs,
such that the sever cannot infer any order from some reverse computations. The proposed scheme
satisfies both privacy and correctness with zero probability of error, and achieves the lower bound
as T →∞.
Remark 5. The problem of private sequential computation is related to the problem of private
computation. However, we have the following observations:
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• In private sequential computation, the input vectors W1:T are not delivered to the servers.
This means that the user decides what information about the input files should be delivered
to each server. This is due to the specific modeling of the problem where the servers are for
function computation. They are not for storing the input files of the user. In addition, in
private computation, the user holds the function, while in private sequential computation, the
servers hold all of the functions.
• In the model of private sequential computation, the computational limits of servers are taken
into account. This means that it is not efficient, due to the definition of the problem, to ask
each servers to compute all K! possible permutations of the functions on the input data, and
then retrieve the desired result, using a PIR solution.
• In [38], it is shown that the capacity of private computation is (1 − 1
N
)/(1 − 1
NK
), which
is similar to the capacity of PIR. One may think that due to the problems definitions, the
capacity of private computation is an upper bound on the capacity of private sequential
computation problem. However, the capacity expression in Theorem 1 is strictly greater than
the aforementioned capacity. It is not a contradiction. Note that the scalings in the definition
of rates in the two problems are different. There is a multiplicative factor of K in this paper
that makes the rates definitions different.
Remark 6. As the number of functions goes to infinity, i.e., K →∞, the achievable lower bound
approaches 1− 1
N
. Generally, we have the following inequality:
1−
1
N
≤ C ≤ 1. (6)
To prove of Theorem 1, we propose a private sequential computation scheme in Section 5. The
scheme is different for the two cases K ≤ N and K > N . The achievability proof is provided in
Section 6, while we propose the proof of the upper bound in Section 7.
4 Motivation and Examples
We consider special cases of the problem of private sequential computation in this section, in order
to explain the main idea of the achievable scheme.
4.1 Warming Up
Example 1. This examples explain why for K ≤ N , Theorem 1 states that the capacity of private
sequential computation is equal to one. Consider the problem of private sequential computation
with N = 2 servers and K = 2 functions. Assume that the user has only T = 1 data vector W1,
and it wants to compute F2(F1W1), i.e., σ = (2 1). One simple achievable scheme is as follows:
the user asks the first server to compute the function F1 on W1, i.e., F1W1. After receiving the
result of the computation, the user asks the second server to compute the function F2 on F1W1.
Trivially, such scheme has the correctness property. Also, it is private5. Note that if desired order is
σ = (1 2), i.e., the user wants the results of F1(F2W1), then the second server computes F2 on W1,
i.e., it computes F2W1, then the first server run F1 on F2W1, i.e., computes F1(F2W1). In other
words, for both σ = (2 1) and σ = (1 2), server one always runs F1 and server two always runs F2.
Therefore, each server learns nothing about the desired order of computations.
5 Note that FWt ∼Wt for any invertible matrix F .
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We use the following schematic to demonstrate this achievable scheme:
σ = (2 1)
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
F1W1 F2(F1W1)
σ = (1 2)
SERVER 2 SERVER 1
F2W1 F1(F2W1)
Generally, when K ≤ N , one can employ a similar approach to achieve the capacity in a one-shot
zero-error setting as follows:
σ = (σK σK−1 · · · σ1)
SERVER σ1 SERVER σ2 · · · SERVER σK
Fσ1W1 Fσ2(Fσ1W1) . . . FσK (· · · (Fσ1W1) · · · )
Example 2. This example demonstrates how to achieve the lower bound on the capacity for cases
K > N . Consider the problem of private sequential computation with N = 2 servers and K = 3
functions. Assume that the user has T input vectors W1:T , for some integer T , and wants to
deliver Fσ3(Fσ2(Fσ1W1:T )), i.e., the desired order is σ = (σ3 σ2 σ1). The scheme presented in
Example 1 breaches information about σ. It is because the computation of the third function at
each server (without any coding) will disclose some information about the order of computations;
see the following:
σ = (3 2 1)
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
F1W1 F2(F1W1)
F3(F2(F1W1)) −
σ = (3 2 1)
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
F1W1 F2(F1W1)
− F3(F2(F1W1))
In the above schemes, one server can apply reverse computation and gain information about the
order of computations. One possible solution is to add randomness to the queries to ensure the
privacy; see the following:
σ = (3 2 1)
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
F1W1 F2(F1W1)
F3(F2(F1W1)⊕ Z) F3Z
Is the above scheme private? Indeed, due to the reverse computation, no information can be inferred
by the servers. However, for the other orders of computations σ, it is required to ask different orders
of inquiries at the servers. For example, due to the above scheme, to compute the order σ = (2 1 3),
it is required to ask the servers to compute F3 → F2 and F1 → F2 as orders of computations. It is
impossible to ask a fixed order of inquiries that works for all permutations to achieve the privacy
in the above one-shot setting. To solve this issue, we introduce the following computation scheme.
Assume that the user asks the servers to compute a specific sequence of functions, no mater what
the desired order of computations is. In particular, assume that the user asks the first server to
compute the sequence F1 → F3 → F1 → · · · → F1︸ ︷︷ ︸
2T+1
and the second server to compute the sequence
F2 → F3 → F2 → · · · → F2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2T+1
. Because the sequence of the computed functions by each server is
predetermined, it cannot reveal any information about the desired order of computations.
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The next step is to assign the input vectors to the servers at each step, such that the privacy and
correctness constraints hold. To achieve privacy, we utilize a number of randomly generated vectors,
which are independent from any other random variables in the problem. In below, we demonstrate
how the user asks queries to attain this purpose for all possible options for the desired order of
computations. Note that the arrows show the order of asking the queries and the random variables
Z1:T+2 are distributed independently and uniformly over F
L.
σ = (3 2 1)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1W1
F3Z1
F2(F1W1)
F3(F2(F1W1)⊕ Z1)
2
F1W2
F3Z2
F2(F1W2)
F3(F2(F1W2)⊕ Z2)
...
...
...
T
F1WT
F3ZT
F2(F1WT )
F3(F2(F1WT )⊕ ZT )
T + 1 F1ZT+1 F2ZT+2
σ = (3 1 2)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1(F2W1)
F3(F1(F2W1)⊕ Z1)
F2W1
F3Z1
2
F1(F2W2)
F3(F1(F2W2)⊕ Z2)
F2W2
F3Z2
...
...
...
T
F1(F2WT )
F3(F1(F2WT )⊕ ZT )
F2WT
F3ZT
T + 1 F1ZT+2 F2ZT+1
σ = (2 3 1)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1W1
F3Z2
F2Z1
F3(F1W1 ⊕ Z2)
2
F1W2
F3Z3
F2(F3(F1W1))
F3(F1W2 ⊕ Z3)
3
· · ·
· · ·
F2(F3(F1W2))
· · ·
...
...
...
T
F1WT
F3ZT+1
· · ·
F3(F1WT ⊕ ZT+1)
T + 1 F1ZT+2 F2(F3(F1WT ))
σ = (2 1 3)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1Z1
F3(W1 ⊕ Z3)
F2Z2
F3Z3
2
F1(F3W1)
F3(W2 ⊕ Z4)
F2(F1(F3W1))
F3Z4
3
F1(F3W2)
· · ·
F2(F1(F3W2))
· · ·
...
...
...
T
· · ·
F3(WT ⊕ ZT+2)
· · ·
F3ZT+2
T + 1 F1(F3WT ) F2(F1(F3WT ))
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σ = (1 3 2)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1Z1
F3(F2W1 ⊕ Z2)
F2W1
F3Z2
2
F1(F3(F2W1))
F3(F2W2 ⊕ Z3)
F2W2
F3Z3
3
F1(F3(F2W2))
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
...
...
...
T
· · ·
F3(F2WT ⊕ ZT+1)
F2WT
F3ZT+1
T + 1 F1(F3F2(WT )) F2ZT+2
σ = (1 2 3)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2
1
F1Z2
F3Z3
F2Z1
F3(W1 ⊕ Z3)
2
F1(F2(F3W1))
F3Z4
F2(F3W1)
F3(W2 ⊕ Z4)
3
F1(F2(F3W2))
· · ·
F2(F3W2)
· · ·
...
...
...
T
· · ·
F3ZT+2
· · ·
F3(WT ⊕ ZT+2)
T + 1 F1(F2(F3WT )) F2(F3WT )
Let us describe the case σ = (3 2 1) as an example. In above, it is illustrated that the user
first asks the first server to compute F1W1. Then, the user asks the second server to compute F2
on the output of the first server in the previous step of computation. After this step, the user
has access to F2(F1W1). The user then generates a random vector Z1 and then asks the second
server and first server to compute F3(F2(F1W1) ⊕ Z1) and F3Z1, respectively. After this step
the user has access to its desired content. In addition, the servers do not have any information
about the desired permutation of the user. There are two reasons for that. As one can see above,
the order of computations is the same at server one, for any desired order of computations. In
addition, additional randomness guarantees that each server receives 2T + 1 independent vectors,
and thus subsequent computations at each server does not leak any information through reverse
computations. Hence, the scheme is private.
After showing that the proposed scheme has the privacy and correctness properties, we compute
its rate. In total, there are 4T + 2 usage of the servers, while the user wants to compute three
functions on T input vectors. Hence, the rate of computation is 3T4T+2 . As T → ∞, this rate
achieves the claimed lower bound on the capacity of the problem, which is equal to 34 .
4.2 A Systematic Approach to Construct Achievable Schemes
Example 2 shows that one can use a predetermined association for the sequence of functions to be
computed by the servers, in addition to exploit random vectors in order to achieve a lower bound
on the capacity in the asymptotic regime. However, we require a systematic approach to construct
the achievable schemes for arbitrary K,N . We explain our construction in the following example.
Note that the method is a bit different from the previous example. However, the ideas of both are
similar.
Example 3. Consider the problem of private sequential computation with N = 3 servers andK = 4
functions6. Assume that the user has 2T input vectors, denoted by Wi,j, i ∈ [1 : T ], j ∈ {1, 2},
and wants to compute Fσ4(Fσ3(Fσ2(Fσ1W1:T,1:2))), i.e., σ = (σ4 σ3 σ2 σ1). We first assign a
predetermined order of computations to each server.
6 In this example, we apply minor changes on the notations described in Section 2. These changes are explained
through the example.
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Assume that the user asks server n , n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to compute the sequence of functions as
Fn → Fn → F4 → Fn → Fn → F4 → · · · → Fn → Fn → F4︸ ︷︷ ︸
3(T+3)
,
no matter what the desired order of computations is. This means that to compute 2T requests,
the user asks 3(T + 3) queries from each server, and 9T + 27 queries in total. Let us illustrate the
proposed function assignment as follows:
σ = (σ4 σ3 σ2 σ1)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2 SERVER 3
1
F1
F1
F4
F2
F2
F4
F3
F3
F4
2
F1
F1
F4
F2
F2
F4
F3
F3
F4
...
...
...
...
T + 3
F1
F1
F4
F2
F2
F4
F3
F3
F4
For the convenience in the description of the achievable scheme, we divide the computations
of 3(T + 3) functions at each server to T + 3 blocks of computations, each comprised of three
computations. It can be observed that the function assignment is the same for all the blocks.
Assume that the blocks of computations are requested by the user sequentially. This means that
the user first asks all of the queries in a block from the servers, then begins the next block. Also
assume that the queries in each block are asked by the user in an arbitrary order. We claim that by
exploiting this function assignment and order determination, one can design an achievable scheme
for any desired permutation. Note that in this case, there are 4! = 24 distinct permutations. We
focus on two specific permutations to illustrate the achievable scheme.
4.2.1 σ = (1 3 4 2)
In the following figure, we propose the procedure of computations in the first four blocks. In this
scheme, the variables7 Z∗ are drawn randomly and uniformly, and they are independent from all
the other variables in the problem. In the first block, the requests corresponded to W1,{1,2} are
considered and the function F2 is applied on them (at server 2). In the second block, the user
has access to F2W1,{1,2}, and asks the servers one and two to apply the function F4 on them. To
run F4, the user utilizes a randomly drawn vector to ensure the privacy of the computation. Also,
the user in this block again asks from the second server to perform a similar task to the previous
block on new vectors W2,{1,2}. The third block is also similar. The function F3 is executed on the
requests corresponded to W1,{1,2}, the function F4 is computed for the requests corresponded to
W2,{1,2}, and the function F2 is computed for the requests corresponded to W3,{1,2}. In the fourth
block, the user again asks three servers to compute specific functions similar to the third block. In
7 Note that the seven variables in the first block named as Z∗ are essentially different and independent from each
other. However, because we do not exploit them any more in the scheme, they are not denoted differently.
10
addition, for the requests corresponded to W1,{1,2}, the function F1 is computed and the final result
of commutation for them is available at the end of this block. The rest of the scheme is similar,
where 2T requests are computed in the T + 3 blocks of commutations. Observe that the scheme
is correct and private. The privacy is due to the fact that all the inputs given to each server are
uniformly and independently drawn vectors, which are independent from the desired permutation
of the user. Also the order of computations at each server is the same for all desired permutations.
σ = (1 3 4 2)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2 SERVER 3
1
F1Z∗
F1Z∗
F4Z∗
F2W1,1
F2W1,1
F4Z∗
F3Z∗
F3Z∗
F4Z∗
2
F1Z∗
F1Z∗
F4(F2W1,1 ⊕ Z2)
F2W2,1
F2W2,2
F4(F2W1,2 ⊕ Z2)
F3Z∗
F3Z∗
F4Z2
3
F1Z∗
F1Z∗
F4(F2W2,1 ⊕ Z3)
F2W3,1
F2W3,2
F4(F2W2,2 ⊕ Z3)
F3(F4(F2W1,1)))
F3(F4(F2W1,2)))
F4Z3
4
F1F3(F4(F2W1,1))
F1F3(F4(F2W1,2))
F4(F2W3,1 ⊕ Z4)
F2W4,1
F2W4,2
F4(F2W3,2 ⊕ Z4)
F3(F4(F2W2,1)))
F3(F4(F2W2,2)))
F4Z4
Now we compute the rate of the proposed scheme. Note that there are 2T input vectors and we
have 4 functions (8T in total), while the user utilizes the servers for 9T + 27 times. Therefore, the
rate of the proposed achievable scheme is 8T9T+27 , which goes to
8
9 as T →∞
8.
4.2.2 σ = (4 3 2 1)
To observe that the proposed approach works for any permutation, we consider another permutation
here and construct a similar scheme for this case, which is as follows:
σ = (4 3 2 1)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2 SERVER 3
1
F1W1,1
F1W2,1
F4Z∗
F2Z∗
F2Z∗
F4Z∗
F3Z∗
F3Z∗
F4Z∗
2
F1W2,1
F1W2,2
F4Z∗
F2(F1W1,1)
F2(F2W1,2)
F4Z∗
F3Z∗
F3Z∗
F4Z∗
3
F1W3,1
F1W3,2
F4Z∗
F2(F1W2,1)
F2(F2W2,2)
F4Z∗
F3(F2(F1W1,1))
F3(F2(F1W1,2))
F4Z∗
4
F1W4,1
F1W4,2
F4(F3(F2(F1W1,1))⊕ Z4)
F2(F1W3,1)
F2(F2W3,2)
F4(F3(F2(F1W1,2))⊕ Z4)
F3(F2(F1W2,1))
F3(F2(F1W2,2))
F4Z4
8 We note that this rate is not necessarily optimum for the one-shot case and one may compute privately 2T
requests with less than 9T + 27 computations. However, in the asymptotic regime, the rate achieves the claimed
lower bound on the capacity and the gap is vanishing.
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We now exactly analyze the proposed scheme in Example 3 to generalize it in the next section.
Let us formally denote the procedure of computation of the kth function in the sequential compu-
tation (which is identical to Fσk), for the requests corresponded to Wt,{1,2}, by R
k
t . In Example 3,
the user utilized T + 3 blocks of computations, and performed all the tasks Rkt , for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
and t ∈ [1 : T ]. In particular, it is shown that the following task assignment is feasible (i.e., can be
performed using specific codes):
BLOCK TASK TASK TASK TASK
1 R11
2 R12 R
2
1
3 R13 R
2
2 R
3
1
4 R14 R
2
3 R
3
2 R
4
1
5 R15 R
2
4 R
3
3 R
4
2
...
...
...
...
...
T R1T R
2
T−1 R
3
T−2 R
4
T−3
T + 1 R2T R
3
T−1 R
4
T−2
T + 2 R3T R
4
T−1
T + 3 R4T
In the formal description in above, we assigned the task R11 to the first block. This means that
at the end of the first block, Fσ1W1,{1,2} must be available at the user side. For the second block,
we assigned two tasks R12 and R
2
1. This means that at the end of this block, the user must be able
to access Fσ1W2,{1,2} and Fσ2(Fσ1(W1,{1,2})). Generally, before the t
th block, the tasks Rk
′
t′ such
that k′ + t′ ≤ t must be already performed, and the tasks Rk
′
t′ such that k
′ + t′ = t + 1 must be
performed at the tth block. By this explanation, one can see that if there is a computation scheme
that can perform all of the above tasks, then it is 2T−achievable. In Example 3, it is shown that
such computation scheme exists. We will generalize this approach for arbitrary K,N in the next
section to construct an achievable scheme9.
5 The Achievable Scheme
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we propose an achievable scheme for arbitrary K,N . We note that as shown in
Example 1, one can simply design an achievable scheme when K ≤ N . Hence, throughout this
section, we focus on cases K > N . Also, with a minor change in notations described in Section
2, we assume that there are T (N − 1) requests (rather than T requests) in the system10. We also
denote the input vectors of user by Wi,j, for i ∈ [1 : T ] and j ∈ [1 : N − 1].
To ensure the privacy and correctness constraints, we rely on the following considerations:
• The index of functions to be computed by each server is assigned in a deterministic manner,
no matter what permutation is to be computed. We refer to this task as function assignment
9 The procedure of task assignment is utilized to propose the achievable scheme more apprehensible. We note that
there is not any necessity for the user to achieve the outputs of the tasks. The only necessity is to find the target
result with high accuracy.
10 Note that the achievability proof requires a sequence of schemes for each T . We will discuss how this problem
does not effect any thing in the asymptotic regime in next section.
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in the paper. We use the notion of block of computations, similar to Section 4, to propose an
appropriate function assignment.
• Whenever required, the user exploits randomly generated vectors to ensure privacy.
In the following subsections, we first propose a deterministic function assignment, and then we
deign an appropriate task assignment. After these steps, we propose a vector assignment, which
is defined as the process of associating appropriate vectors to be transmitted from the user to the
servers in queries.
5.2 Function Assignment
First we define the notion of block of computations as follows.
Definition 6. A block of the computations for a private sequential computation problem with N
servers and K functions is defined as
PHASE NUMBER SERVER 1 SERVER 2 · · · SERVER N
1
1
2
...
N − 1
F1
F1
...
F1
F2
F2
...
F2
· · ·
· · ·
. . .
· · ·
FN
FN
...
FN
2
N
N + 1
...
K − 1
FN+1
FN+2
...
FK
FN+1
FN+2
...
FK
· · ·
· · ·
. . .
· · ·
FN+1
FN+2
...
FK
As shown above, each block contains two phases. In the first phase, each server computes a specific
function, for N − 1 times, and in the second phase, all servers compute K −Nsimilar functions.
Now, we are ready to propose the function assignment of the achievable scheme. In the achievable
scheme, we utilize a deterministic function assignment, which comprised of T + K − 1 replicated
blocks of computations a described above. To determine the order of queries asked by the user, we
follow up the following rules:
• The queries are asked block by block, i.e., the user first asks all of the queries of the first
block, then asks all of the queries of the second block, and so on.
• At each block, the user asks the queries by an arbitrary order. As we will show, all the vectors
send by the user to the servers at each block are available at the user side before the block
begins.
5.3 Task Assignment
Let us first introduce a few useful notations.
Definition 7. Formally, we denote the procedure of computation of the kth function in the sequential
computation (which is identical to Fσk), for the requests corresponded to Wt,1:N−1, by R
k
t .
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We refer to the assignment of the tasks to the blocks of computations in order to perform them
as task assignment in the paper. Note that there is not any necessity to define blocks, and then
assign tasks to them. The only requirement in the paper is to find a correct and private computation
scheme. But to the propose achievable scheme, we utilize these definitions and design a computation
scheme that performs all tasks Rkt , t ∈ [1 : T ], k ∈ [1 : K], in order to reach the desired result. In
this way, an important step is to find an appropriate task assignment.
We propose the following task assignment for the achievable scheme:
BLOCK TASK TASK TASK · · · TASK
1 R11
2 R12 R
2
1
3 R13 R
2
2 R
3
1
...
...
...
...
. . .
K R1K R
2
K−1 R
3
K−2 · · · R
K
1
...
...
...
...
...
...
T R1T R
2
T−1 R
3
T−2 · · · R
K
T−K
T + 1 R2T R
3
T−1 · · · R
K
T−K+1
T + 2 R3T · · · R
K
T−K+2
...
. . .
...
T +K − 1 RKT
Formally, we assign the task Rk
′
t′ to the t
th block of computations, if and only if t′ + k′ = t+ 1.
As a result, all tasks Rk
′
t′ , such that t
′ + k′ ≤ t, are performed before the block t begins.
5.4 Vector Assignment
Let us provide a few definitions which are used later.
Definition 8. Define
Ini(R
k
t ) := Fσk−1(Fσk−2(· · · (Fσ1Wt,i) · · · )) (7)
and
Outi(R
k
t ) := Fσk(Fσk−1(· · · (Fσ1Wt,i) · · · )) (8)
for any t ∈ [1 : T ], k ∈ [1 : K], and i ∈ [1 : N − 1].
Corollary 1.
Outi(R
k
t ) = Fσk Ini(R
k
t ) (9)
= Ini(R
k+1
t ). (10)
Corollary 2. After performing the task Rkt , the value of Out1:N−1(R
k
t ) is available at the user side.
To introduce the achievable scheme, after the function assignment and task assignment, the last
part is to define the vectors transmitted from the user to the servers in each step. Let us benefit pi
to denote the unique permutation pi ∈ SK such that σpi = piσ is the identity permutation. In the
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proposed achievable scheme, for each t ∈ [1 : T +K − 1], at the tth block of computations, the user
asks the nth server to perform the computation on the following vectors11:
BLOCK PHASE SERVER 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 SERVER N
...
...
...
...
t
1
In1(R
pin
t−pin+1
)
In2(R
pin
t−pin+1
)
...
InN−1(R
pin
t−pin+1
)
2
Inn(R
piN+1
t−piN+1+1
)⊕ Zt,1
Inn(R
piN+2
t−piN+2+1
)⊕ Zt,2
...
Inn(R
piK
t−piK+1
)⊕ Zt,K−N
Zt,1
Zt,2
...
Zt,K−N
...
...
...
...
In above, at the first phase, the server n, receives the vectors Ini(R
pin
t−pin+1
), i ∈ [1 : N − 1]. In the
second phase, the two cases n < N and n = N are different. If n < N , then the server receives
Inn(R
piN+i
t−piN+i+1
)⊕Zt,i, i ∈ [1 : K −N ], and if n = N , it receives Zt,i, i ∈ [1 : K −N ]. Note that the
random vectors Zt,i, i ∈ [1 : K −N ], are distributed uniformly over F
L, and they are independent
from each other and from all the other random variables in the problem.
We note that the vectors Ini(R
pik
t−pik+1
) for each i ∈ [1 : N−1], k ∈ [1 : K], and t ∈ [1 : T+K−1]
are well defined, except the cases that t − pik + 1 ≤ 0. For such cases, we assume that the user
utilizes a uniformly drawn random vector, which is independent from all of the other variables in
the problem, rather than Ini(R
pik
t−pik+1
), in the vector assignment. See the vectors Z∗ in Example 3
for more details.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the proposed function assignment and vector assignment.
6 Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove the achievability part of Theorem 1. In order to do so, we utilize the
propose scheme in the previous section. In particular, we first prove that the proposed scheme is
feasible, i.e., the proposed vector assignment is feasible, meaning that the user has access to the
contents required to be transmitted to the servers at the time of transmission (see Subsection 5.4).
Then, we prove the correctness and privacy of the proposed scheme. Finally, considering minor
required modifications in the achievable scheme, we prove the desired result.
6.1 Proof of Feasibility and Correctness
In this part, we first prove that the proposed vector assignment is feasible to be performed by the
user, and then, we show the correctness of the proposed scheme.
Consider the following propositions:
• (V A)t: The t
th block’s vector assignment is feasible, meaning that the vectors sent by the
user in that block are available at the user side before the block begins.
11 Note that an important question regarding the proposed vector assignment is that whether it is feasible or not.
More precisely, it is required to be proved that the inputs assigned to each block are available at the end of the
previous block. We will prove this fact in the next section.
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σ = (σK σK−1 · · · σ1), σ
−1 = (piK piK−1 · · · pi1)
BLOCK SERVER 1 SERVER 2 · · · SERVER N − 1 SERVER N
...
...
...
...
...
...
t
F1In1(R
pi1
t−pi1+1
)
F1In2(R
pi1
t−pi1+1
)
...
F1InN−1(R
pi1
t−pi1+1
)
FN+1(In1(R
piN+1
t−piN+1+1
)⊕ Zt,1)
FN+2(In1(R
piN+2
t−piN+2+1
)⊕ Zt,2)
...
FK(In1(R
piK
t−piK+1
)⊕ Zt,K−N )
F2In1(R
pi2
t−pi2+1
)
F2In2(R
pi2
t−pi2+1
)
...
F2InN−1(R
pi2
t−pi2+1
)
FN+1(In2(R
piN+1
t−piN+1+1
)⊕ Zt,1)
FN+2(In2(R
piN+2
t−piN+2+1
)⊕ Zt,2)
...
FK(In2(R
piK
t−piK+1
)⊕ Zt,K−N )
...
FN−1In1(R
piN−1
t−piN−1+1
)
FN−1In2(R
piN−1
t−piN−1+1
)
...
FN−1InN−1(R
piN−1
t−piN−1+1
)
FN+1(InN−1(R
piN+1
t−piN+1+1
)⊕ Zt,1)
FN+2(InN−1(R
piN+2
t−piN+2+1
)⊕ Zt,2)
...
FK(InN−1(R
piK
t−piK+1
)⊕ Zt,K−N )
FN In1(R
piK
t−piK+1
)
FN In2(R
piK
t−piK+1
)
...
FN InN−1(R
piK
t−piK+1
)
FN+1Zt,1
FN+2Zt,2
...
FKZt,K−N
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 1: The proposed function assignment and vector assignment.
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• (TA)t: The t
th block’s task assignment is feasible, meaning that after that block, the assigned
tasks are perfectly performed.
In order to prove the feasibility of the proposed funcion and task assignments, we need to show
that all the propositions (V A)t, (TA)t, t ∈ [1 : T +K−1], hold. Note that (V A)1 is correct, trivially
(see Subsection 5.4). Let us state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any t ∈ [1 : T +K − 1], (V A)t =⇒ (TA)t.
Proof. Using the assumption in lemma, In1:N−1(R
pik
t−pik+1
), k ∈ [1 : K], are available before the
tth block of computations begins. Hence, the user can ask the queries based on the structure
described in vector assignment step. Now note that after the first phase of the block, the values of
Fn′ Ini(R
pi
n′
t−pi
n′+1
), i ∈ [1 : N − 1], n′ ∈ [1 : N ] are available at the user side.
In addition, at the second phase of the tth block, if we cancel the random vectors Zt,i, i ∈ [1 :
K −N ], we conclude that all of the values of Fn′ Ini(R
pi
n′
t−pi
n′+1
), i ∈ [1 : K − 1], n′ ∈ [N + 1 : K].
All in all, all the values of Fn′ Ini(R
pi
n′
t−pi
n′+1
), i ∈ [1 : N − 1], n′ ∈ [1 : K], are available for the user
after the completion of the tth block.
Now observe that by changing the variables as n′ = σk,
Fn′ Ini(R
pi
n′
t−pi
n′+1
) = Fσk Ini(R
piσ
k
t−piσk+1
) (11)
= Fσk Ini(R
k
t−k+1) (12)
= Outi(R
k
t−k+1), (13)
which means that after tth block, all tasks Rkt−k+1, k ∈ [1 : K] are performed. Therefore, the lemma
is proved.
Lemma 2. For any t ∈ [1 : T +K − 2], (TA)t =⇒ (V A)t+1.
Proof. We need to show that all of the values of Ini(R
pik
(t+1)−pik+1
), i ∈ [1 : N − 1], k ∈ [1 :
K], are available for the user before the (t + 1)th block begins. Note that12 Ini(R
pik
(t+1)−pik+1
) =
Outi(R
pik−1
(t+1)−pik+1
). Also, the task Rpik−1(t+1)−pik+1 is performed before the (t + 1)
th block (using the
assumption in lemma), since ((t+ 1)− pik + 1) + (pik − 1) = t+ 1. Hence, the proof is complete.
Considering Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and using induction, one can see that all the propositions
(IA)1:T+K−1 and (TA)1:T+K−1 hold. This means that at the end of the last block, all the tasks
RKt , t ∈ [1 : T ] are performed, and hence the values of Out1:N−1(R
K
t ) are available at the user side.
Therefore, the correctness proof of the proposed scheme is complete.
6.2 Proof of Privacy
To prove the privacy constraint, we require to show that for the proposed achievable scheme,
I(Q˜n, F1:K ; Σ) = 0, for each n ∈ [1 : N ]. Due to the deterministic function assignment in the
proposed scheme, the only requirement is to show that the inputs given to the servers do not leak
any information about the desired permutation.
12 If (t+ 1)− pik + 1 ≤ 0, then the claim is trivial, because the required vectors are randomly drawn.
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Let us denote the inputs given to the nth server at the tth block of computations by Xn,t :=
In1:N−1(R
pin
t−pin+1
), for the first phase, and Yn,t,[1:K−N ] ⊕ Zt,[1:K−N ], for the second phase. Due to
the proposed vector assignment, we have
Yn,t := Yn,t,[1:K−N ] =
{
Inn(R
pi[N+1:K]
t−pi[N+1:K]+1
) : n ∈ [1 : N − 1]
O[N+1:K] : n = N,
where Oi ∈ F
L, i ∈ [K +1 : N ], are all zero vectors. In addition, we define Zt := Zt,[1:K−N ] and we
briefly write Yn,t ⊕ Zt to denote Yn,t,[1:K−N ] ⊕ Zt,[1:K−N ].
We need to show that
P(Σ = σ′|Q˜n, F1:K) = P(Σ = σ
′′|Q˜n, F1:K), (14)
for each σ′, σ′′ ∈ SK . Note that
P(Σ = σ|Q˜n, F1:K) =
P(Q˜n, F1:K |Σ = σ)P(Σ = σ)
P(Q˜n, F1:K)
(15)
=
P(F1:K |Σ = σ)P(Q˜n|Σ = σ, F1:K)P(Σ = σ)
P(Q˜n, F1:K)
(16)
= µ(Q˜n, F1:K)P(Q˜n|Σ = σ, F1:K), (17)
where µ(Q˜n, F1:K) is a constant that does not depend on σ. Also,
P(Q˜n|Σ = σ, F1:K)
(a)
= P
(
(Xn,t, Yn,t ⊕ Zt)t∈[1:T+K−1]|Σ = σ, F1:K
)
(18)
(b)
=
∏
t∈[1:T+K−1]
P(Xn,t, Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Σ = σ, F1:K) (19)
(c)
=
∏
t∈[1:T+K−1]
P(Xn,t|Σ = σ, F1:K)
∏
t∈[1:T+K−1]
P(Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Σ = σ, F1:K) (20)
=
1
|F|L(N−1)(T+K−1)
×
1
|F|L(K−N)(T+K−1)
(21)
=
1
|F|L(K−1)(T+K−1)
, (22)
which completes the proof. Note that (a) holds because the utilized function assignment is deter-
ministic, (b) holds because conditioning on Σ = σ and F1:K , we have the following Markov chain:
(Xn,t1 , Yn,t1 ⊕ Zt1)→Wt1−pin+1,1:N−1 →Wt2−pin+1,1:N−1 → (Xn,t2 , Yn,t2 ⊕ Zt2), (23)
for each13 t1 6= t2. Also, (c) holds because
I(Yn,t ⊕ Zt;Xn,t|Σ = σ, F1:K) = H(Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Σ = σ, F1:K)−H(Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Xn,t,Σ = σ, F1:K) (24)
≤ (K −N)L−H(Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Xn,t,Σ = σ, F1:K) (25)
≤ (K −N)L−H(Yn,t ⊕ Zt|Xn,t,Σ = σ, F1:K , Yn,t) (26)
= (K −N)L−H(Zt) (27)
= (K −N)L− (K −N)L (28)
= 0. (29)
13 Note that if ti − pin + 1 ≤ 0, then the claimed Independence hold trivially.
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6.3 Proof of Achievability
In the previous section, we provided an achievable scheme for the cases where the number of requests
is divided by N−1. However, to prove the achievability, we need to propose a sequence of achievable
scheme for any number of requests (see Section 2).
Consider a general case of the private sequential computation problem in which there are arbi-
trary number of requests T (N − 1) + r. Here 0 ≤ r ≤ N − 2 is an arbitrary integer. We propose
an achievable scheme for the problem with these parameters as follows. For the first T (N − 1)
requests, assume that the user utilizes the proposed scheme of the previous section. For any r
remaining requests, the user asks an arbitrary server to compute all of the possible permutations
for that request, i.e., the user asks the server for K × K! times14 for each request. Due to the
previous discussions, it is obvious that this scheme is both private and correct. Hence, it gives a
(T (N − 1) + r)−achievable rate.
Let us compute the rate for the proposed scheme for arbitrary number of requests T (N −1)+ r.
For the first T (N − 1) requests, the scheme includes T + K − 1 blocks, each require N(K − 1)
function computations. For the remaining r requests, the user asks the servers for r×K×K! times.
All in all, there are (T + K − 1) × N(K − 1) + r × K × K! number of queries. Also, there are
T (N − 1) + r requests for the sequential computation of K function at the user side. Hence, the
rate of the proposed scheme is
R =
K × (T (N − 1) + r)
(T +K − 1)×N(K − 1) + r ×K ×K!
. (30)
One can see that as the number of requests tends to infinity (i.e., T → ∞), this rate achieves
K(N−1)
N(K−1) =
1− 1
N
1− 1
K
, which matches the capacity of the problem. Therefore, the achievability proof is
complete.
7 Converse Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the converse of Theorem 1 in the following.
7.1 Preliminaries
Lemma 3. Consider a matrix F ∈ {F ′ ∈ FL×L : det(F ′) 6= 0}, which is chosen randomly and
uniformly, and T randomly and uniformly generated vectors, Wt ∈ F, t ∈ [1 : T ], each independent
from the other vectors and from F . Let W := (W1,W2, . . . ,WT ) ∈ F
L×T be a randomly generated
matrix. We claim that the following propositions hold:
(a) H(FW1:T ) = H(W1:T ) = TL
(b) H(FW1:T |W1:T ) = L× E
[
rank(W )
]
(c) P(rank(W ) < T )
L→∞
−−−−→ 0
(d) H(FW1:T |W1:T ) = T × (L− o(L))
Proof of (a). TL = H(W1:T ) = H(FW1:T |F ) ≤ H(FW1:T ) ≤ TL.
14 Actually, this is not efficient to ask this numerous number of requests and the user can ask fewer questions.
However, this effect vanishes in the asymptotic regime.
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Proof of (b). Denote an arbitrary realization of random vectors W1:T by w1:T . Let rank(w) =
dim(span(wS)), where S = {s1, s2, . . . , srank(w)} ⊆ [1 : T ] includes rank(w) distinct elements. Add
specific vectors to the columns of matrix (ws1 , ws2 , . . . , wsrank(w)), and construct a matrix
U =
(
ws1 , ws2 , . . . , wsrank(w) , U1, U2, . . . , UL−rank(w)
)
∈ FL×L, (31)
such that U is an invertible matrix. Note that F ′ := FU ∼ F . Let et ∈ F
L denotes the vector
with all zero elements, except the tth element, which is equal to one. Note that U−1wst = et, for all
t ∈ [1 : rank(w)]. Now we write
H(FW1:T |W1:T = w1:T ) =
rank(w)∑
t=1
H(Fwst |Fws1:t−1) +H(Fw[1:T ]\S |FwS) (32)
(a)
=
rank(w)∑
t=1
H(Fwst |Fws1:t−1) (33)
=
rank(w)∑
t=1
H((FU)U−1wst |(FU)U
−1ws1:t−1) (34)
=
rank(w)∑
t=1
H(F ′U−1wst |F
′U−1ws1:t−1) (35)
=
rank(w)∑
t=1
H(F ′et|F
′e1:t−1) (36)
=
rank(w)∑
t=1
L (37)
= L× rank(w), (38)
where (a) follows since wt ∈ span(wS), for each t ∈ [1 : T ]\S. Now taking the expectation from the
two sides of the above inequality yields the desired result.
Proof of (c). Observe that
P(rank(W ) < T ) = P
( T⋃
t=1
{Wt ∈ span(W1:t−1)}
)
. (39)
(40)
Note that dim(span(W1:t−1)) ≤ t− 1, which means that each vector in span(W1:t−1) can be written
as the weighted summation of t−1 specific vectors. This means that span(W1:t−1) contains at most
|F|t−1 distinct vectors. However, the vector Wt is chosen uniformly from the set F
L. Therefore, the
probability that Wt lie in span(W1:t−1) can be upper bounded by |F|
t−1−L. Now we write
P
( T⋃
t=1
{Wt ∈ span(W1:t−1)}
)
≤
T∑
t=1
P
(
Wt ∈ span(W1:t−1)
)
(41)
≤
T∑
t=1
|F|t−1−L (42)
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=
|F|T − 1
|F|L(|F| − 1)
, (43)
(44)
which goes to zero as L→∞. This completes the proof.
Proof of (d). Using (b), (c), we obtain
H(FW1:T |W1:T ) = L× E
[
rank(W )
]
(45)
= L×
( T−1∑
0=1
t× P(rank(W ) = t) + T × P(rank(W ) = T )
)
(46)
= L×
( T−1∑
0=1
t× o(1) + T × (1− o(1))
)
(47)
= T × (L− o(L)). (48)
Lemma 4. For any random variables X,Y,Z, such that Z takes values from Z,
I(X;Y |Z)− log(|Z|) ≤ I(X,Y ) ≤ log(|Z|) + I(X;Y |Z). (49)
Proof.
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (50)
≤ H(X)−H(X|Y,Z) (51)
≤ H(X,Z)−H(X|Y,Z) (52)
= H(Z) +H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z) (53)
= H(Z) + I(X,Y |Z) (54)
≤ log(|Z|) + I(X,Y |Z). (55)
In addition, we write
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (56)
≥ H(X|Z)−H(X|Y ) (57)
= H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z) +H(X|Y,Z) −H(X|Y ) (58)
= I(X,Y |Z) +H(X|Y,Z) −H(X|Y ) (59)
= I(X,Y |Z)− I(X;Z|Y ) (60)
≥ I(X,Y |Z)−H(Z|Y ) (61)
≥ I(X,Y |Z)−H(Z) (62)
≥ I(X,Y |Z)− log(|Z|). (63)
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7.2 Proof of the Converse
In order to prove the converse, we show that for each T−achievable rate RT , we have RT ≤ 1,
meaning that D ≥ KT . Let us define15 D
(L)
k := |{d ∈ [1 : D] : Q
(function)
d = k}| for a given
computation scheme. Note that D =
∑K
k=1 E
[
D
(L)
k
]
. Observe that to prove the converse, it is
sufficient to show that E
[
D
(L)
k
]
≥ T − o(1) for each k. Consider a sequence computations schemes,
for L ∈ N, for the T−achievable rate RT (see Definition 3). To review, note that from Fano’s
inequality, we obtain
H(F
(L)
ΣK
F
(L)
ΣK−1
· · ·F
(L)
Σ1
W
(L)
t |W
(L)
1:T , Q
(L)
1:D, A
(L)
1:D,Σ) = o(L), (64)
for any t ∈ [1 : T ]. For the sake of brevity, we do not write the superscripts (L) throughout this
section any more. Also, let FΣ := FΣKFΣK−1 · · ·FΣ1 and F∼k := (F1, F2, · · · , Fk−1, Fk+1, · · · , FK).
Fix an integer k ∈ [1 : K]. We write
TL
(a)
= H(FΣW1:T |F∼k,Σ) (65)
= H(FΣW1:T |W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D, F∼k,Σ) + I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ) (66)
≤
T∑
t=1
H(FΣWt|W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D, F∼k,Σ) + I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ) (67)
≤
T∑
t=1
H(FΣWt|W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D) + I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ) (68)
(b)
≤ T × o(L) + I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ) (69)
(c)
≤ o(L) +D log(K) + I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D ), (70)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3, (b) follows from the correctness property, and (c) follows from
Lemma 4 and the fact that Q
(function)
1:D ∈ [1 : K]
D.
Let δ1:D ∈ [1 : K]
D denotes an arbitrary realization of Q
(function)
1:D . Let S = {s ∈ [1 : D] : δs = k}.
Assume S = {s1, s2, . . . , sdk} denote the elements of S, which are ordered increasingly
16.
Lemma 5. For any integer d ∈ [1 : D],
I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:d, AS∪[1:d]|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (71)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:d−1, AS∪[1:d−1]|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D). (72)
Proof. Conditioning on F∼k,Σ and Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D, we have the following Markov chain:
FΣW1:T → (W1:T , Q1:d−1, AS∪[1:d−1])→ Qd → Ad × 1{d ∈ S}, (73)
which concludes the desired result.
15Th numbers D
(L)
k
, k ∈ [1 : K], are possibly random, due to the random function assignment. However, the
summation of them is deterministic, which is equal to D.
16 The realization of the random variable Dk is denoted by dk.
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Using Lemma 5, we obtain
I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, A1:D|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (74)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D, AS∪[1:D]|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (75)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D−1, AS∪[1:D−1]|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (76)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1:D−2, AS∪[1:D−2]|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (77)
= · · · (78)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , Q1, AS∪{1}|F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (79)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T , AS |F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) (80)
= I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T |F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D) + I(FΣW1:T ;AS |F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D,W1:T )
(81)
(a)
≤ I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T |F∼k,Σ) +D log(K) + I(FΣW1:T ;AS |F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D,W1:T ) (82)
≤ I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T |F∼k,Σ) +D log(K) +H(AS |F∼k,Σ, Q
(function)
1:D = δ1:D,W1:T ) (83)
≤ I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T |F∼k,Σ) +D log(K) +H(AS) (84)
(b)
≤ I(FΣW1:T ;W1:T |F∼k,Σ) +D log(K) + Ldk (85)
= H(W1:T |F∼k,Σ)−H(FΣW1:T |F∼k,Σ,W1:T ) +D log(K) + Ldk (86)
(c)
= TL− T (L− o(L)) +D log(K) + Ldk, (87)
where (a) follows from Lemma 4, (b) follows from the fact that |S| = dk, and (c) follows from
Lemma 3. Taking the expectation from (87) and combining with (70) results
TL ≤ o(L) +D log(K) + TL− T (L− o(L)) +D log(K) + L× E
[
Dk
]
(88)
= o(L) + 2D log(K) + L× E
[
Dk
]
. (89)
Therefore,
T ≤ o(1) +
2D log(K)
L
+ E
[
Dk
]
(90)
≤ o(1) + E
[
Dk
]
. (91)
Hence, we conclude that E
[
Dk
]
≥ T − o(1), which completes the proof.
8 An Open Problem: One-shot Capacity?
As long as K ≤ N , it is shown in the paper that the one-shot capacity of the private sequential
computation is the same as the asymptotic capacity, which is equal to one. A remaining open
problem is the characterization of the one-shot capacity of private sequential computation for cases
K > N . In particular, for a given T , if we define T−capacity as the supremum of all T−achievable
rates, how can we characterize the exact value of it. While this problem remains open throughout
the paper, we provide a minor result on the one-shot capacity for the special case of K = 3 functions
and N = 2 servers. Note that due to Theorem 1, for the (asymptotic) capacity of the problem in
this case, the rate of 34 is achievable.
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Theorem 2. The one-shot capacity of the private sequential computation for the case of K = 3
functions and N = 2 servers is the same as the claimed lower bound for the (asymptotic) capacity
of the problem, i.e., when T = 1, the user can ask 4 queries from 2 servers in order to sequentially
private compute three functions.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it is sufficient to propose an achievable scheme for the one-shot
case. The proposed one-shot achievable scheme is definitely different from the achievable scheme of
Theorem 1. The key idea to construct a one-shot achievable scheme is to exploit a random function
assignment strategy.
8.1 One-shot Achievable Scheme
Let us label the servers from {1, 2}. Assume the servers know their label. Let (U3 U2 U1) ∈ S3 be
a uniform random permutation, independent from the desired permutation Σ = (Σ3 Σ2 Σ1). We
utilize a random function assignment to propose an achievable scheme as follows:
U1 = Σ3
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
FU1 FU3
FU2 FU1
U1 6= Σ3
SERVER 1 SERVER 2
FU1 FU1
FU2 FU3
In the above random function assignment, for cases where U1 = Σ3, we utilize the left assignment,
and for cases where U1 6= Σ3, we utilize the right assignment.
Let Z ∈ FL be a randomly and uniformly drawn vector, independent from all of the other
random variables in the problem. For vector assignment, we use the following rules:
U1 = Σ3
PERMUTATION SERVER 1 SERVER 2
Σ = (U1 U2 U3)
FU1Z
FU2(FU3W1)
FU3W1
FU1(FU2(FU3W1)⊕ Z)
Σ = (U1 U3 U2)
FU1Z
FU2W1
FU3(FU2W1)
FU1(FU3(FU2W1)⊕ Z)
U1 6= Σ3
PERMUTATION SERVER 1 SERVER 2
Σ = (U2 U1 U3)
FU1(FU3W1 ⊕ Z)
FU2(FU1(FU3W1))
FU1Z
FU3W1
Σ = (U2 U3 U1)
FU1Z
FU2(FU3(FU1W1))
FU1(W1 ⊕ Z)
FU3(FU1W1)
Σ = (U3 U1 U2)
FU1Z
FU2W1
FU1(FU2W1 ⊕ Z)
FU3(FU1(FU2W1))
Σ = (U3 U2 U1)
FU1Z
FU2(FU1W1)
FU1(W1 ⊕ Z)
FU3(FU2(FU1W1))
Now we prove the desired properties for the proposed one-shot scheme. The correctness proof is
trivial, due to the above explanations in the figures. For privacy, note that the inputs given to each
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server by the user are independent from each other, and independent from the order of computations,
and both are distributed uniformly over FL. Hence, they do not reveal any information about the
order of computations to the servers. To complete the privacy proof, it just remains to show that
the proposed function assignment is also the same.
The first server cannot attain any information about the order of computations from the function
assignment, because (U1, U2) is independent from Σ. For the second server, let (V1, V2) denote the
index of functions asked from it to compute, respectively. In other words, (V1, V2) = (U3, U1), if
U1 = Σ3, and (V1, V2) = (U1, U2), if U1 6= Σ3. We require to show that P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2) does
not depend on Σ, for each distinct v1, v2 ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Let A := {U1 = Σ3} be a probability event, which happens with probability
1
3 . We write
P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2) = P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2,A)P(A|V1 = v1, V2 = v2) (92)
+ P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2,A
c)P(Ac|V1 = v1, V2 = v2) (93)
=
1
3
× P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2,A) +
2
3
× P(Σ|V1 = v1, V2 = v2,A
c) (94)
(a)
=
1
3
× (
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0) +
2
3
× (0, 0,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) (95)
= (
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
), (96)
where (a) is due to the structure of the proposed random function assignment.
9 Conclusion and Discussion
Information and coding theory open new directions toward optimal resource utilization for the
distributed storages and distributed computation systems. Codes have demonstrated their ability
to solve challenges in such systems. This line of research revolves around finding the potentials of
coding theory to be used in the computation/storage systems.
In this paper, we progress toward the obtaining fundamental limits of private computation from
information theoretic viewpoint. A system model for specific type of sequential computation was
proposed, in addition to deriving non-trivial lower/upper bounds for the capacity of the problem.
An open problem regarding the capacity of private sequential computation for the finite number
of requests is also proposed. The future direction for this work is the consideration of the non-
linear functions, colluding databases, and the computation when the user is allowed to request the
computation of a function in the sequence redundantly. Another question which can be considered
for the future works is the investigation of the potentials of random function assignment to achieve
improved one-shot or asymptotic rates for the private sequential computation problem.
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